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Briefing Paper 
ENTERPRISE ZONES - EMERGING EVIDENCE AND CRITICISMS 
M G Lloyd, Department of Land Economy, 
University of Aberdeen 
Enterprise zones were introduced in the 
Local Government, Planning and Land Act 
1980 and the Finance Act 1980. The 
concept was introduced as a rad ica l , 
market based alternative to the prevailing 
convent ional p o l i c i e s for reg iona l 
development and urban regeneration. Thus 
enterprise zones were intended for areas 
"of economic and physical decay where 
conventional economic pol ic ies have not 
succeeded in regenerating self-sustaining 
economic activity" in order "to test as an 
experiment, and on a few s i t e s , how far 
industrial and commercial activity can be 
encouraged by the removal or streamlined 
administration of cer ta in statutory or 
administrat ive controls."1 Enterprise 
zones are seen by the government as a 
popular expression of i t s broad l ibe ra l 
market philosophy, and as experiments 
which would serve to i l l u s t r a t e how 
private economic in teres ts would respond 
to the removal or r a t iona l i sa t ion of 
government r e g u l a t i o n s and controls . 
Th i s may be c o n s i d e r e d an e a r l y 
manifestation of the government's supply-
side approach, which sought to create 
conditions conducive to more ef f ic ient 
production^ The concept was introduced 
for an i n i t i a l period of ten years, and 
t h e zones were c o n s i d e r e d to be 
independent of prevailing regional and 
urban policies, which were themselves to 
be cr i t ical ly reviewed. 
In pract ice , enterpr ise zones are areas 
designated central government, and managed 
by a zone authority (in most cases by the 
local authority) within which cer ta in 
incentives are provided. These include a 
simplified s tatutory planning regime for 
land use and property development, a 
number of f inancial provisions including 
the exemption of firms from local ra tes 
and 100% capital allowances for income and 
corporation tax purposes on industrial and 
commercial p roper ty . There are in 
a d d i t i o n a number of a s s o c i a t e d 
deregulatory measures, designed to free 
t he p r i v a t e s e c t o r from g e n e r a l 
governmental bureaucratic procedures. 
When f i r s t in t roduced the f i n a n c i a l 
p rov i s ions included exemption from 
Development Land Tax, but t h a t has 
subsequently been abo l i shed . The 
incentives provided in the enterpr ise 
zones had very specific purposes, and 
provide an insight into the intended 
mechanisms of change in the designated 
areas. These were expected to succeed 
where conventional spending and regulatory 
instruments were seen to have fai led. 
The incentives were effectively intended 
to increase the returns on investment in 
property development in the zones and, in 
th i s context, the simplified planning 
regime and the in i t ia l exemption from DLT 
were to provide the necessary p r e -
conditions. Subsequent to th i s i n i t i a l 
stage the derating provision and f i sca l 
relief would provide a subsidy to firms to 
viably locate and produce in the zones. 
The introduction of the enterprise zone 
concept has prompted a considerable debate 
as to t h e l i k e l y e f f e c t s of t he 
experiment. Concern was expressed, for 
example, at the implications of creating 
simplified planning regimes for this type 
and standard of development and as to the 
l ikely effects on any residents in the 
areas designated as enterpr ise zones.3 
Furthermore i t was argued t h a t the 
financial concessions provided in the 
zones would spec i f i c a l l y bene f i t the 
landowners involved, par t icular ly with 
respect to the exemptions from ra tes , 
which i t was argued would be translated 
into higher rents.4 Concern was also 
expresssed about the l ike ly spi l lover 
effects of the designated enterprise zones 
on surrounding property markets where a 
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b l i g h t i n g of values and r e n t s was Firth sub-region following the closure of 
considered a possible result.5 the Invergordon aluminium smelter.6 
The Government subsequently designated 
eleven enterprise zones in urban locations 
which were perceived of as 'problem' 
areas. The Clydebank enterprise zone is 
a prime example. In general terms the 
enterprise zones were characterised by 
de re l i c t land, redundant buildings and a 
depressed local economy. A number of the 
enterprise zones were already the focus of 
public sector development init iat ives such 
as the Clydebank Task Force. The 
enterprise zone designations were made 
independently of the existing incidence of 
conventional economic policies but, in the 
event, the location of the zones resulted 
in the areas benefit t ing further from 
established regional assistance and urban 
policy measures. This overlapping has 
proved to be an important f ac to r in 
stimulating ac t iv i ty in the zones, not 
l e a s t from a marketing pe r spec t i ve . 
Another general characteristic is that the 
public sector, including local authorities 
and the nationalised indust r ies , were 
significant landowners in the zones. As 
a consequence, the public sector has 
tended to assume an important role in 
providing land with p o t e n t i a l for 
development. In effect this may be seen 
as a contradiction as the experiment was 
aimed primarily at the private sector, yet 
in r ea l i ty i t involved a considerable 
commitment by t he p u b l i c s e c t o r , 
par t icular ly in terms of infrast ructure 
provision and land preparation. 
In l a t e 1982 the Government in i t i a t ed a 
second round of enterprise zones which 
differed substant ia l ly from the ea r l i e r 
designations. The la t te r zones tended to 
be s i t e s which were in much improved 
condition at designation, and, therefore, 
had greater potent ial for more rapid 
development. The majority of zones, for 
example, were situated in greenfield sites 
and established industrial estates. The 
second round zones were also characterised 
by a high public sector prof i le , such as 
in the Tayside (Dundee-Arbroath) zone, and 
furthermore were not necessarily confined 
to broad urban l o c a t i o n s . The 
Invergordon enterpr ise zone i s a case in 
point. However, this la t ter designation 
must be viewed as a specific response to 
the localised d i f f i cu l t i e s in the Moray 
The evidence and findings 
The evidence re la t ing to the subsequent 
changes in the physical environment and 
the levels and type of investment and 
employment in the zones i s derived from 
two main sources. Firstly, there are the 
f indings of the o f f i c i a l monitoring 
e x e r c i s e which was undertaken by 
consultants (Roger Tym and Partners). 
The study was se t up in 1980 to monitor 
the f i r s t round of designated enterprise 
zones over a three year period. The main 
aim of the monitoring exercise was to 
record the economic activity generated in 
the zones. A secondary aim was to assess 
to what extent any development of property 
and generation of and investment and 
employment was a t t r i b u t a b l e to the 
specific measures which comprised the 
enterprise zone experiment. The evidence 
collected by the monitoring exercise was 
subsequently published in the form of 
three annual reports and covers the period 
1981—1983- Information is provided 
r e l a t i n g to the cond i t ions in the 
e n t e r p r i s e zones a t t he t ime of 
des igna t ion , and then for the two 
subsequent years of effective operation.7 
The second main source of information i s 
the report published by the Department of 
the Environment, based on an in-house 
monitoring system. This provides 
evidence of change in the f i r s t and second 
round zones for 1983-1984, but a t a l e s s 
detailed level of analysis compared with 
t he o f f i c i a l mon i to r ing e x e r c i s e . 
Unfortunately the two sets of information 
are not entirely compatible, due primarily 
to changes in defini t ion and coverage of 
the data bases used.8 The Department of 
the Environment intend to continue the 
annual update on the physical and economic 
change in the designated enterprise zones, 
to be supplemented with less frequent in-
depth studies of the mechanisms of change 
in the enterprise zones. 
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The annual r e p o r t s of the o f f i c i a l 
monitoring exercise confirm that physical 
and economic change has taken place in the 
f i rs t round enterprise zones. In general 
terms the evidence shows that there has 
been a marked improvement in physical 
conditions and an increase in the number 
of firms and jobs in the zones. The more 
recent annual update by the Department of 
the Environment confirms that this trend 
is continuing for the f i r s t round zones, 
and that development i s taking place in 
the l a t e r designations. The evidence 
shows tha t the leve ls of investment, 
development and economic change i s not 
uniform for the designated zones. The 
total investment in s i te development over 
the period 1981-1983, for example, shows 
cons ide rab le v a r i a t i o n between the 
individual zones. The largest amount of 
public sector inf ras t ruc ture investment 
has o c c u r r e d in t h e I s l e of Dogs 
designated area, although the Clydebank 
zone has a t t rac ted the second la rges t 
commitment in t h i s respect . The l a t e s t 
published information available from the 
Department of the Environment, which 
r e l a t e s to September 1984, shows tha t 
48,200 jobs were located in the designated 
enterpr ise zones; 6,800 of which were 
located in the Scottish zones. Of these 
5,500 were in the Clydebank zone, 1,200 in 
Dundee and 100 in Invergordon. The 
evidence shows that 2,018 establishments 
were located in the zones, and of the 276 
in Scot land , some 236 were in the 
Clydebank e n t e r p r i s e zone.9 The 
d i f fe ren t ia l r a t e s of progress in the 
Scott ish zones r e f l ec t s the timing of 
de s igna t i on , the p rev i l ing local ised 
economic circumstances, as shown in the 
contrast between Invergordon and Dundee, 
and the p u b l i c p o l i c y framework 
established to deal with the problems of 
decline.1 0 
The final monitoring report of the f i r s t 
round enterprise zones concludes that the 
main stimulus to physical and economic 
change in the zones i s the f i sca l re l ie f . 
The simplified planning regime and the 
reduction in regulat ions are not held to 
have had a s i g n i f i c a n t impac t on 
stimulating economic activity. The most 
'successful ' zones were those who had 
benefitted from complementary measures 
such as regional ass is tance , and the 
massive injection by the public sector in 
terms of infrastructure provision and land 
preparation. The report concludes that 
w h i l s t e n t e r p r i s e zones of fer the 
potential to generate economic benefits to 
the areas designated, the measures tha t 
comprise enterpr ise zones are themselves 
insufficient to guarantee those benefi ts . 
The contribution of traditional incentives 
and subsidies have thus played a very 
important role in f a c i l i t a t i n g economic 
change in the zones. 
Criticism 
The report by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, published ea r l i e r th i s year, 
was highly cr i t ical of the enterprise zone 
experiment, particularly in terms of the 
public sector costs involved. These 
criticisms were subsequently deliberated 
and s t rong ly endorsed by the Public 
Accounts Committee.12 The main issues 
may be considered as follows. 
F i r s t l y , the Comptroller and Auditor 
General's report pointed to the issue of 
uncovenanted benefits associated with the 
d e s i g n a t i o n s . These r e f e r to the 
benefits derived by the existing firms in 
the zones a t the time of designation who 
qualified automatically for the incentives 
and concessions being made available. The 
benefits are unconvenanted in the sense 
that they accrue to the firms irrespective 
of any change in their contribution to the 
economic wel fa re of the a rea . The 
Comptroller and Auditor General estimated 
that the cost to the Exchequer in terms of 
rates exemption for the f i r s t round zones 
for the i n i t i a l ten year experimental 
period would be in excess of £50 million 
(at 1981-1982 price and r a t e s l eve l s ) . 
The costs associated with rates exemptions 
for the second round zones over the ten 
year period i s estimated at £20 million 
(at 1983-1984 prices). 
Secondly, the Comptroller and Auditor 
General expressed concern a t the public 
sector costs of the experiment. I t was 
suggested that, with respect to the f i rs t 
round zones, the cost per job could be 
disproportionately high up to October 
1984. Although doubts were expressed as 
to the data avai lable , i t was estimated 
that the public sector costs comprised the 
following: 
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( i ) r a tes exemptions to 31/3/85: £50 
million 
( i i ) capi ta l allowances to 1/10/54: £50 
million 
( i i i ) publ ic inves tment to 1983: £80 
million 
( iv) Total: £180 million 
Furthermore, i t was pointed out that these 
estimates did not allow for investment 
that would have taken place i r respect ive 
of the enterprise zone measures. This 
point has been subsequently c la r i f ied by 
the Department of the Environment in their 
evidence to the Public Accounts Committee, 
where i t was suggested tha t some 20% of 
public sector investment would have taken 
place anyway. Concern was also expressed 
regarding the effects of enterprise zones 
on prevailing levels of rents, land values 
and the pattern of retailing in the areas 
concerned. 
Finally, the Comptroller and Auditor 
General was highly c r i t i c a l of the 
monitoring arrangements set up by the 
Department of the Environment. He argued 
t h a t "whi l s t e n t e r p r i s e zones have 
provided benefits in combating dereliction 
and establ ishing a focus for economic 
a c t i v i t y and inves tment , t he re were 
continuing uncertainties as to the extent 
to which these potential benefits had been 
real ised and how far resu l t s achieved 
could be attributed to particular policies 
or programmes". I t was concluded that 
" their overall effect has not yet been 
assessed and compared with that of other 
pol ic ies and programmes; and some of the 
resu l t s could involve disproportionate 
cos t to the exchequer and are being 
achieved part ly a t the expense of other 
areas". 
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
endorsed the criticisms of the monitoring 
arrangements set up by the Department of 
the Environment. I t argued that the 
"absence of p r e - s e t t a rge t s inh ib i t s 
effective planning and in this particular 
ca se may impede f u l l y o b j e c t i v e 
assessments of success or fa i lu re , of 
performance and of cost effectiveness". 
The PAC pointed out that the l imi ta t ions 
of monitoring and the availability of data 
r e s t r i c t e d an understanding of the 
dynamics of change within the enterprise 
zones, and did not enable an assessment of 
the effects of individual measures, such 
as simplified planning as against tax 
re l ief . Furthermore, there was l i t t l e 
reliable information as to the extent that 
p r i v a t e sec to r investment had been 
s t imu la t ed by the e n t e r p r i s e zone 
ini t iat ive, although i t was intended as a 
private sector experiment. The PAC also 
expressed a concern with the effects of 
enterprise zones, such as the d is tor t ing 
effects on surrounding areas and whether 
the ra tes exemptions were being simply 
t ranslated into higher rents . Other 
problems related to the nature of the 
developments t ak ing p l a c e . This 
c r i t ic i sm i s primarily concerned with 
warehousing activi t ies which, whilst being 
extensive in terms of i t s land take, i s 
not a major job creator . The PAC report 
se ts out a powerful indictment of the 
enterpr ise zone experiment in s ta t ing 
"that what i s s t i l l lacking i s a fu l l , 
thorough and objective assessment of the 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the zones, e i t h e r 
individually or in aggregate, balancing 
quan t i f i ed and q u a l i t a t i v e b e n e f i t s 
against the ful l public sector costs and 
the adverse effects produced elsewhere". 
The displacement effects of the enterprise 
zone experiment clearly emerge as the main 
issue. The monitoring reports point to 
the short distance relocation of firms 
i n t o the zones , which s u g g e s t s a 
depressing and detrimental effect on those 
areas losing economic ac t iv i ty in th is 
way. The final monitoring report points 
to circumstances where the private sector 
i s active and the enterprise zone has 
served to reduce the confidence of 
d e v e l o p e r s , wi th t he r e s u l t t h a t 
ar t i f ic ia l patterns of values are created. 
In contrast , however, in some zones such 
as Clydebank, the enterprise zone measures 
have stimulated the private sector in 
development h i ther to undertaken by the 
publ ic s e c t o r . Evidence produced 
elsewhere from d e t a i l e d s t u d i e s of 
individual enterprise zones confirm these 
criticisms and i l lustrate the differential 
displacement effects of enterprise zones. 
An analysis of the Salford - Trafford Park 
enterprise zones reveals the creation of a 
dual property market, with indust r ia l 
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building ren t s much increased in the zone 
and decreased in t h e pe r i phe ry . This 
s tudy a l s o r e v e a l s t h a t l a n d l o r d s w i th 
holdings in the one expropriated over 60% 
of t h e l o c a l r a t e s exemptions through 
h i g h e r r e n t s ( 1 3 ) . A s t u d y of t h e 
Swansea en te rpr i se zone shows tha t for the 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s who l o c a t e d in the zone, 
the r e l i e f from p rope r ty tax i s the only 
i n c e n t i v e of s i g n i f i c a n c e . This study 
a l s o shows t h a t t h e e n t e r p r i s e zone 
d e s i g n a t i o n s e r v e s t o c o n s o l i d a t e 
development trends well establ ished pr ior 
t o de s igna t ion .14 The c r i t i c i s m s and 
f i n d i n g s se rve to s u b s t a n t i a t e the case 
for much more de ta i led information about 
the mechanics of en te rpr i se zones before a 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e j u d g e m e n t can be made 
r e g a r d i n g t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h i s 
pa r t i cu l a r supply-side i n i t i t i a t i v e . 
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